The Game and Incentive Mechanism for Implementing Low-carbon Technologies in Supply Chain

Game theory and revenue sharing contracts are used to analyze the strategies for the retailer and the manufacturer to implement low-carbon technologies in two-stage supply chain in different relationships and different status and discuss the incentive conditions for the manufacturer to implement low-carbon technologies as well as the allocation of Pareto optimal residual income in the whole supply chain. The results have shown that，in the case of decentralized decision-making，the retailer in the static game equilibrium will not share implementation costs of low carbon technology with the manufacturer，but will increase low-carbon subsidies to motivate the manufacturer to improve the level of emission reduction，while in Stackelberg equilibrium，the retailer will choose the favorable strategy combination involving the ratios of implementation cost and price subsidies，which can achieve the same incentive effect; in the case of centralized decision-making，the retailer and the manufacturer will collaborate to implement low-carbon technologies，which can enable the supply chain reach Pareto optimization of the overall profit，and the revenue sharing contract based on Rubinstein bargaining model can motivate the parties to collaborate in emission reduction.