The Path for Regulating Escape of Administrative Discretionary Benchmark in China

Reasonably escaping from the administrative discretionary benchmark can help achieve the discretionary effect of appropriate punishment in individual cases, but the derivative problems of improper escape and escape laziness highlight the need to establish a mechanism for escape regulation. From a practical perspective, the escape regulation mechanism consisting of legislative, administrative, and judicial approaches is unable to deal with the problems of improper escape and escape laziness. The fundamental reason lies in the poor connection and functional dislocation between the nature of the discretion benchmark itself and the administrative-judicial regulation mechanism. Standardizing the construction of the escape clause built into the discretionary benchmark, optimizing the administrative-judicial regulation mechanism through the construction of an “process control” administrative responsibility system and a “three-stage” judicial review method, can help ensure that the application of escape can be used as a legitimate means to achieve substantive justice in individual cases without deviating from the path of rule of law and standardization.