The Impact of “Salary Limited” and the Regulating Effect of Equity Incentive in State-owned Enterprises

Based on the data of listed companies from 2011 to 2018, taking state-owned listed companies as the experimental group and non-state-owned listed companies as the control group, this paper tests the salary restriction effect of "2015 salary restriction order" on state-owned enterprises with “DID” method, and analyzes the regulatory effect of equity incentive on the negative effect of salary restriction, so as to judge the mixed policy effect of salary restriction and equity incentive. The empirical results show that "salary limit order 2015" has a certain inhibitory effect on the rise of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises, but it is not significant in reducing the difference between executive and ordinary employees. At the same time, there are some negative effects, including higher turnover rate, lower asset turnover rate. Equity incentive can significantly inhibit some negative effects.