Two-sided Platform Pricing Research Considering Reference Price Effects And Information Level

With the development of Internet and information technology,the platform attracts more users to join the platform by setting a higher reference price and a lower original. Thus,the reference price also has a significant impact on users' decision-making behavior and platform pricing. Based on the consideration of users' information level in monopoly two-sided markets,the reference price is introduced into users' demand function,a two-sided platform equilibrium model is constructed and the impact of the reference price effect on platform pricing is analyzed. The research shows that the monopoly platform should allow users to be informed. Besides,set a higher reference price and the actual low price. When the users are uninformed,the optimal pricing on both sides of the platform increase with the increase of users' reference price. However,when the users are informed,with the increase of the network externality on both sides of the platform,the increase of the buyer's(seller's) reference price makes the platform's price charged to the buyer(seller) increase first and then decrease,and the relationship between the seller's(buyer's) reference price and the platform's price charged to the buyer (seller) also depends on the relative size of the network externality on both sides of the platform. The platform gains more when users are informed and the growth of revenue increases with users' reference price and influence coefficient of users' reference price.