Effective Stability Control Research of Evolutionary Game in China's Coal Mine Safety Supervision

In view of the problem of different interests and influences of stakeholders and their complicatedly dynamic game in the process of coal mining safety supervision and regulation in China, this paper analyzed the systemically evolutionary game of stakeholders in the coal mining safety supervision and regulation system, which includes the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMS),the Local Regulation Departments of Coal Mine Safety, and coal enterprises. Moreover, the game was simulated by combining evolutionary game theory and system dynamics and the simulation results showed that strategy selections of the three stakeholders fluctuate repeatedly which indicates that evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in the game process. Therefore, the dynamic penalty-incentive measure was proposed to control the fluctuations and then simulated again. The simulation results showed that the measure can effectively restrain the fluctuations and present an ideal evolutionary stable strategy under which coal enterprises will choose safety production as their optimal strategy.