Abstract: Carbon asset pledge financing model is vital to alleviate the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. However,the collusion between enterprises and carbon certification institutions has led to the lower participation of banks and the slow development of carbon assets pledge business. In view of the above problems,this paper introduces the government incentive policies and constructs the evolutionary game model of government-enterprise-bank-carbon trading center,and takes Certified Emission Reduction(CERs) as an example to explore the realization path of the Pareto optimal state of carbon asset pledge financing mechanism. The simulation experiments are conducted with meaningful results:compared with a single subject,the simultaneous change of the participation willingness of the enterprises and the carbon trading centers has the greatest influence on the participation willingness of the banks; the government's penalties can restrain the conspiracy between the enterprises and the carbon trading center,and strengthening the punishment of enterprises in the collusion can promote the sustainable development of CERs pledge financing market faster; under government incentives,risk-compensation mechanism can help the market achieve Pareto optimal state more effectively than risk-sharing mechanism. Above conclusions can provide a theoretical basis for the development of Chinese Certified Emission Reduction(CCER) project and policy guidance for the carbon asset pledge financing market.