府际关系视角下区域环境政策执行偏差研究——基于博弈模型的分析

    Research on Regional Environmental Policy Implementation Deviation from the Perspective of Intergovernmental Relation—Based on Game Model

    • 摘要: 区域环境政策执行对改善环境质量、推进生态文明建设意义重大。基于府际关系视角,通过构建三个博弈模型,对区域环境政策执行过程中的政府行为进行分析。研究发现:在区域环境政策执行过程中,从横向府际关系来看,地方政府之间存在"共谋行为",负面的"共谋行为"会导致政策执行出现偏差;从纵向府际关系来看,行政发包制的政策执行机制,在以经济增长为中心的政治锦标赛背景下,会造成政策执行的"囚徒困境";从时间维度上看,中央政府的监管举措是约束地方政府政策执行偏差的必要条件。为此,地方政府间应增强互信与信息共享,中央政府必须创新政策执行机制、政绩考核机制、激励机制、问责机制和协调机制,建立社会监督体系,推进区域环境治理的技术创新。

       

      Abstract: The implementation of regional environmental policies is of great significance for improving environmental quality and promoting the construction of ecological civilization. Based on the perspective of inter-governmental relations,the analysis of government behavior in the process of regional environmental policy implementation by constructing a game model reveals that in the process of regional environmental policy implementation,there is "collusion behavior" between horizontal inter-governmental governments,and negative "collusion behavior" will lead to deviations in policy implementation; there is a policy implementation mechanism for administrative contracting between the central and local governments. Under the political championship centered on economic growth,it will result in a "prisoner's dilemma" for policy implementation; In terms of dimensions,the central government's regulatory measures are necessary to constrain the implementation bias of local government policies. To this end,local governments should enhance mutual trust and information sharing; the central government must improve the policy implementation mechanism,performance evaluation mechanism,incentive mechanism,accountability mechanism and coordination mechanism; establish a social supervision system; and promote technological innovation in regional environmental governance.

       

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