Abstract: In order to explore the impact of government regulation on the recycling behavior of informal recycling groups of end-of-life vehicles (ELV), an evolutionary game model between the government and ELV informal recycling groups was constructed. First of all, based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, the dynamic game relationship between ELV informal recycling groups and the regulatory authorities was studied, and then the pay-off matrix was obtained. Secondly, through the analysis of the stability of single and mixed strategy evolution, this paper discussed the influence of different government regulation methods on the recycling strategy of ELV informal recycling groups. Finally, the influence of initial strategy ratio and government regulation on the stability of strategy evolution was further verified through numerical simulation. The results showed that the system replicated dynamic equation group consisted of four saddle points and a central point. The process of strategy evolution had the characteristics of repeatability and periodicity, and each local area would converge to a stable point. The regulators should encourage auto manufacturing enterprises to actively carry out vertical integration of supply chains, while increasing subsidies for formal recycling channels, and severely crack down on informal recycling channels. Informal recycling groups should positively seek cooperation in order to form industrial alliances, and gradually complete the transformation and upgrading, reducing the risk of government regulation.