基于三方演化博弈的网约车出行市场规制策略

    Regulation Strategy of Ride-hailing Market based on Tripartite Evolution Game Theory

    • 摘要: 网约车出行市场规制已经成为急需解决的重要问题,有必要考虑所涉及的主体对网约车出行市场的规制策略进行研究。在系统分析网约车出行市场多方主体构成的基础上,基于演化博弈理论构建了网约车出行市场规制的三方演化博弈模型,通过模型推导和数值仿真分析了政府管理部门、网约车出行平台和司机三方的演化路径及稳定策略。结果显示:政府、平台和司机单方的演化策略会同时受到其他两方主体策略的影响;政府采取"规制"策略需要考虑政府成本、出行者及司机社会福利、网约车行业稳定和社会公正等因素;平台企业采取"积极管制"策略需要考虑企业收益及成本、平台用户规模以及政府惩戒等;司机采取"合规经营"策略所考虑的因素包括司机收益及成本、用户规模、政府及平台惩戒等。

       

      Abstract: The regulation of ride-hailing market has been a problem demands prompt solution and need to studied consider agents belong to this market. The agents of ride-hailing market are analyzed as a system, then tripartite evolution game model of ride-hailing market regulation is constructed based on tripartite evolution game theory. The evolution path and steady strategy of government, platform and driver is studied through the methods of model deduction and numerical study. The results show that the evolution strategy of government, platform and driver is affected mutually. Furthermore, the strategy making of government should consider the factor of cost, social welfare of both traveler and driver, steady of ride-hailing market and social justice. Moreover, ride-hailing platform should consider profit, cost, consumer scale and punishment when make decision. And driver should consider the profit and cost, consumer scale and the punishment form both government and platform.

       

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