Abstract:
From the perspective of residents' choice of commuting mode, the travel decision variables of private car owners and passengers are divided into two dimensions: travel utility and travel cost. An evolutionary game model is used to study the evolution of ride-sharing service in private cars. It is found that only when the initial scale on both sides of supply and demand exceeds the critical point, can the positive cross network externality of the platform be stimulated and the public participation in sharing can be realized. The critical point of the supply side is relatively low, and the evolution time is shorter when the supply side is used to pull the demand side. The acceptance speed of ride-sharing service by drivers is positively correlated with traffic time index, privacy utility and price level, and negatively correlated with commission rate. While the acceptance speed by passengers is positively correlated with traffic time index and comfort utility, and negatively correlated with price level. Therefore, the platform should not only implement preferential subsidies to the supply side in the short term, but also continuously improve the service cost performance and user satisfaction through measures such as adjusting commission rate, reasonable pricing, improving skills training and evaluation mechanism, etc. The government should determine a reasonable daily order limit, appropriately raise the price ceiling, set up shared lanes, and encourage ride-sharing during commuting time.