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宋凯艺,卞元超.银行业竞争对企业投资效率的影响——基于债务治理与融资约束的双重视角[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2020,22(3):99~110 本文二维码信息
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银行业竞争对企业投资效率的影响——基于债务治理与融资约束的双重视角
The Impact of Banking Competition on Enterprise Investment Efficiency—Dual Perspectives based on Debt Governance and Financing Constraints
投稿时间:2019-05-15  
DOI:10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2020.1565
中文关键词:  银行业竞争  投资效率  融资约束  债务治理
English Keywords:bank competition  firm investment efficiency  financial constraints  debt governance
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目“研发要素流动对区域创新绩效的影响:基于空间资源配置的视角”(71874054);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“国内市场整合视角下环境污染区域协同治理的内在逻辑与提升策略研究”(20YJC790001);江苏省研究生科研创新计划“银行业竞争与中小企业投资决策:最优金融结构视角”(KYCX19_0709)
作者单位
宋凯艺 南京师范大学 商学院, 江苏 南京 210023 
卞元超 南京师范大学 商学院, 江苏 南京 210023 
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中文摘要:
      在全面加快金融供给侧结构性改革背景下,推动银行业竞争是促进金融服务实体经济发展、提升企业投资效率的重要途径之一。基于手动收集的中国各省区商业银行分支机构数据,结合中国上市企业财务数据,考察银行业竞争对企业投资效率产生的影响。研究发现:尽管银行业竞争显著地增加了企业投资水平,但是并未对企业投资效率产生直接的影响。进一步地,银行业竞争虽然通过减少融资约束和加强债务治理来缓解国有企业投资不足行为,但是融资作用的发挥也可能会加剧国有企业过度投资,因而银行业竞争对国有企业投资效率将取决于投资不足和过度投资的相对程度。同时,银行业竞争通过加强债务治理作用抑制非国有企业的过度投资,也通过缓解融资约束问题来减弱非国有企业的投资不足问题,进而共同促进非国有企业投资效率的提高。
English Summary:
      Under the background of speeding up the structural reform of the financial supply side, promoting banking competition is one of the important ways to promote the economic development of financial service entities and enhance the efficiency of firm investment. The intention of this paper is to investigate the impact of banking competition on firm investment efficiency, based on data collected manually from the branches of commercial banks and combined with the financial data of Listed Companies in China. It is found that banking competition has significantly increased the level of firm investment, but not had a direct impact on the efficiency of firm investment. On the one hand, although banking competition alleviates the underinvestment of state-owned enterprises by reducing financial constraints and strengthening debt governance, the role of financing may also aggravate the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises, so the investment efficiency of banking competition for state-owned enterprises will depend on the relative degree of underinvestment and overinvestment. On the other hand, banking competition not only restrains excessive investment of non-state-owned enterprises by strengthening the role of debt governance, also alleviates the problem of insufficient investment of non-state-owned enterprises by alleviating financial constraints, which jointly promote the improvement of investment efficiency of non-state-owned enterprises.
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